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Different inﬂuenza subtypes can evolve at very different rates, but the causes are not well understood. In
this paper, we explore whether differences in transmissibility between subtypes can play a role if there are
ﬁtness constraints on antigenic evolution. We investigate the problem using a mathematical model that
separates the interaction of strains through cross-immunity from the process of emergence for new anti-
genic variants. Evolutionary constraints are also included with antigenic mutation incurring a ﬁtness cost.
We show that the transmissibility of a strain can become disproportionately important in dictating the rate
of antigenic drift: strains that spread only slightly more easily can have a much higher rate of emergence.
Further, we see that the effect continues when vaccination is considered; a small increase in the rate of
transmission can make it much harder to control the frequency at which new strains emerge. Our results
not only highlight the importance of considering both transmission and ﬁtness constraints when model-
ling inﬂuenza evolution, but may also help in understanding the differences between the emergence of
H1N1 and H3N2 subtypes.
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1. BACKGROUND
The two inﬂuenza A subtypes common in humans,
H1N1 and H3N2, frequently escape population immu-
nity by changing their antigenic properties. Between
1983 and 2009, H3N2 ﬁxed more amino acid changes
in antigenic sites than H1N1 [1–4], and vaccines against
H3N2 were updated more often than vaccines against
H1N1 [5,6]. The higher rate of appearance and ﬁxation
of non-synonymous mutations in H3N2 could be owing
to a combination of factors, presumably including effec-
tive virus population size, and selective pressures
according to host prior immunity. However, the root
cause of the epidemiological and evolutionary differences
between subtypes of inﬂuenza in humans remains poorly
understood [7,8].
Transmissibility, or more speciﬁcally the basic repro-
ductive ratio R0, the average number of secondary cases
generated by the average infective individual in a naı ¨ve
population, has been much studied for inﬂuenza [9,10].
The probability that a strain will become established is
determined by its effective reproductive ratio, which
depends on R0 and the level of population immunity. Sea-
sons in which H3N2 was the dominant subtype have been
associated with a higher effective reproductive ratio
[11,12]; there are also typically more deaths from pneu-
monia and inﬂuenza in seasons where H3N2 is the
dominant strain [13]. Transmissibility must be therefore
considered as a possible mechanism behind the difference
in antigenic drift speeds between the two subtypes.
One strain of inﬂuenza may confer partial immunity to
another [14], and multi-strain models can be used to study
the evolutionary dynamics of the disease [15–17]. Here,
we deﬁne a new strain to be a virus in which the surface
proteins have undergone sufﬁcient change, as a result of
mutation, to affect people who were previously immune
to it. We will use such a model to examine the role that
transmission plays in the emergence of new strains.
While multi-strain models are well established, few
allow mutation to directly affect aspects of virus pheno-
type other than antigenicity. Although partially explored
in individual-based simulations [1,18], a previous study
[19] introduced a model to investigate the behaviour of
inﬂuenza evolution when mutation affected the ability of
a virus to transmit between hosts.
In studies in vitro, single nucleotide mutations in
other RNA viruses have resulted, on average, in a ﬁtness
reduction [20–22]. If random mutation carries a ﬁtness
cost, there is a possibility that mutations associated with
antigenic change also affect the phenotype in some other
way, reducing viral ﬁtness of antigenic escape mutants
through antagonistic pleiotropy [23]. Alternatively, or
additionally, ‘deleterious hitchhikers’—mutations else-
where on the genome that happen to be picked up in the
process of emergence of the antigenic escape mutant—
could have a negative effect (M. La ¨ssig 2011, personal
communication). The ill-fated side branches of inﬂuenza’s
evolutionary tree could be the result of costs incurred by
either mechanism (M. La ¨ssig 2011, personal communi-
cation; [24]). However, new inﬂuenza strains appear
every few years [25]; this ongoing antigenic mutation and
survival could be possible through subsequent compensa-
tory mutations [26,27].
Gog [19] developed a simple model of these processes
to show that a high-level ﬁtness loss could in fact stop
viral evolution (‘strain lock’), and that vaccination could
also nudge the system into this state. In this paper, a
two-tier framework is used to separate the interaction of
strains via population immunity, modelled deterministi-
cally, and the emergence of new strains, treated as a
stochastic process. This improves the realism of the ﬁtness
loss and compensatory mutation processes, and makes * Author for correspondence (ak640@cam.ac.uk).
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the examination of a variety of assumptions.
We see that although the rate of emergence increases
almost linearly with transmission in the absence of ﬁtness
constraints, when mutation incurs a cost, small changes in
the R0 of the fully ﬁt virus can have a large impact on
emergence. This is an example of phylodynamics [7],
the relationship between epidemic and evolution
dynamics.
Previous work has shown that often a threshold can
exist where vaccination can slow or pause the emergence
of new strains [19,28,29] and therefore we also look at
how the use of vaccination in slowing antigenic evolution
is affected by change in R0. We show that vaccination can
be far more successful in controlling evolution when ﬁt-
ness costs are present, highlighting the importance of
considering such constraints when modelling inﬂuenza
evolution.
2. METHODS
(a) A two-tiered model
A ﬁrst approach to adding ﬁtness costs to a multi-strain
model, suggested by Gog [19], was to take the one-dimen-
sional line of strains used in many previous models [16,30]
and extend it to a two-dimensional space. Each variant had
an intrinsic ﬁtness, as well as an antigenic type (which chan-
ged in one direction). Mutation to a new antigenic type
caused a reduction in ﬁtness, and compensatory mutations
were included so that strains can also regain ﬁtness lost. A
simple stochastic approximation was included; a test was
imposed on new strains present in less than one individual
to ensure that they did not emerge automatically. This
meant that stochastic effects were present in a basic way,
although the approximation had some drawbacks, which
will be discussed here.
Suppose R0 denotes the basic reproductive ratio of the
fully ﬁt virus, i.e. the top level of strains described by Gog
[19]. This deﬁnition of R0 will be used throughout this
paper. A full ﬁtness strain therefore has an effective reproduc-
tive ratio R ¼ R0S/N, where S is the number of individuals
susceptible to the strain, and N is the population size.
Here, as in Gog [19], we assume that antigenic change
incurs a ﬁxed ﬁtness cost, so a new strain has an effective
reproductive ratio R1 ¼ xR , R initially, where x denotes
the relative ﬁtness of the mutant, reducing R by a factor
0   x   1.
Let I0 be the number of individuals infected with the new
strain. If large numbers are infective with the dominant
strain, even a low rate of mutation will lead immediately to
I0 . 1. Hence it circumvents the stochastic test, and means
a possible ‘overspill’ effect, whereby a circulating strain can
prop up its weaker mutant, allowing it to persist long enough
to undergo a compensatory mutation, despite the fact that
would not necessarily survive if both ﬁtness loss and compen-
sation were modelled as a branching process. Conversely, if
I0 , 1 always, as can happen when the dominant strain is
endemic at low numbers, the stochastic test will not allow
the weaker mutation to ever emerge if it has R , 1. However,
it has been shown that if emergence is modelled stochastically,
infections with R , 1 may still survive long enough to
subsequently undergo a compensatory mutation [9]. A
further issue, mentioned by Gog [19], is that, for x ¼ 1,
there are still two versions of each strain circulating, whereas
ideally the two-dimensional space should collapse to a one-
dimensional line as x approaches 1, and revert to a simple
drift model similar to that of Gog & Grenfell [16].
As a simple model of strain emergence leads to the above
issues, yet a fully stochastic process with mutation and com-
pensation is computationally intensive, a balance must be
sought. We shall therefore use a two-tiered model [31],
focusing on the deterministic and stochastic processes
separately.
A discrete-time deterministic model of infection at the
population level forms the top tier; this is described in §2c.
Mutation to a lower ﬁtness strain occurs at a constant rate
but the actual emergence of new strains, including compen-
satory mutation, is dictated by the bottom tier: a stochastic
approximation, which has boiled down the details of emer-
gence to a simpler process. This is outlined in §2b, and
allows calculation of the probability that the new strain
appears and causes an epidemic. This probability is then
used in the top tier of the model as a test of the viability of
a new strain appearing at each point in time.
(b) Emergence process
We consider two routes to emergence, as shown in ﬁgure 1.
In particular, we wish to determine whether a strain with
R , 1 can mutate before it goes extinct. Similar problems
have been tackled for evolution in the face of selection
pressure [32] and zoonoses [9,33].
First, we outline a useful result that will be used in the full
problem: the probability that a strain with particular ﬁtness
fails to cause an epidemic. We assume that I0   S/N,a n de a c h
infective individual can be considered independent. In the
standard susceptible-infective-recovered model, where the effec-
tive reproductive ratio R is constant, the probability a single
infective individual will fail to generate an epidemic is [34]:
probability of extinction ¼ P ¼
1
R
if R . 1;
1e l s e :
(
As transmission by each infective individual can be
considered independent, we have:
P ¼ min 1;
1
R
   I0
()
: ð2:1Þ
Next, this result can be applied to the full evolutionary
process, with compensatory mutation occurring at rate m.
Let I0(t) be the number of individuals infected with the
reduced ﬁtness strain, which has reproductive ratio R1, and
I2(t) be the number of individuals infected with the compen-
sated strain, with reproductive ratio R2 . R1. Although this
method will work for more general ﬁtness structures, in
this paper we assume full ﬁtness recovery, i.e. R2 ¼ R0S2/N,
where S2 is the number of individuals susceptible to strain 2.
Following Keeling & Rohani [34], if I0 ¼ I(0) ¼ 1, the
probability the reduced ﬁtness strain fails to cause an epi-
demic, P1 can be written as a function of the recovery,
transmission and compensatory mutation processes. P2, the
probability the full ﬁtness strain fails to cause an epidemic,
can be treated the same as P above. Rescaling time by the
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P1 ¼
1
1 þ R1 þ mg
þ
R1
1 þ R1 þ mg
P2
1
þ
mg
1 þ R1 þ mg
P2; ð2:2Þ
where mg ¼ m/g. Taking the smallest root in [0,1] of this
equation gives us the probability that the reduced ﬁtness
strain fails to cause an epidemic [35],
P1 ¼min
1;1 
ðR1  1 mgÞþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðR1  1 mgÞ
2 þ4mgR1ð1 P2Þ
q
2R1
8
<
:
9
=
;
;
ð2:3Þ
where P2 ¼ min f1,1/R2g.
If I0 = 1 and I0 S/N still, we can again use indepen-
dence of interactions to obtain:
P ½fails to emerge jIð0Þ¼I0 ¼P
I0
1 : ð2:4Þ
Also note that if mg ¼ 0 in equation (2.3), we recover the
single strain case P1 ¼ minf0,1/R1g, as expected. This is also
true if R1 2 1 2 mg   4mg(1 2 P2)R1, implying that if there
is little or no ﬁtness cost, with R1 . 1 and mg   1, the prob-
ability of emergence behaves as if we had a single strain
branching process. Therefore, the step-down and step-up
do not have an unnecessary effect if R1 is not reduced by a
ﬁtness cost.
We can use these results to approximate the probability a
strain will emerge in our full model. Suppose strain a is our
frontmost strain (i.e. the one that emerged most recently),
at each point in time, we know the prevalence, Ia, and sus-
ceptibility to a mutant of this strain, Saþ1. If mutation
occurs at a rate m, we would expect to see
I0 ¼ Iað1   e mÞð 2:5Þ
new mutants appear in a single time step. Using the above
results, we can therefore calculate Paþ1 ¼ Paþ1(R1, I0), the
probability that an infective individual fails to emerge with
the new strain a þ 1, with R1 ¼ xSaþ1/N, and I0 as above.
Computationally, this only requires the following test to
be applied at each time step:
Iaþ1 ¼ 0i f Paþ1 . uniform random variable X [ ð0;1Þ;
1 else:
 
Although we have two routes to emergence (ﬁgure 1), and
hence two possible values of R for Iaþ1, it is reasonable to
assume that if the virus does cause an epidemic, its numbers
will end up sufﬁciently large for it to undergo the compensa-
tory mutation during this epidemic [26,36]. Iaþ1 therefore
represents individuals infective with the full ﬁtness strain.
As in Gog [19], unrealistic strain survival is avoided by
setting any strain that decreases in prevalence to I , 1, with
an R , 1, equal to zero. This avoids the decay to inﬁnitesimal
levels (i.e. attostrains [37]), and potential re-emergence,
which can occur in purely deterministic systems.
(c) Epidemic process
The second tier of the model keeps track of how immunity
changes during epidemics at the population level. To do
this, we use a status-based model with one level of ﬁtness
only [16], with Sa denoting the number of hosts susceptible
to (at least) strain a; Ia the number of hosts infectious with
strain a; and La the force of infection of strain a. We will
use a discrete formulation, as it will make it easier to deal
with the mutation step at each point in time (which is
based on the random number tests in §2b). Our system is
therefore:
S0
a ¼ Nð1   e mÞþSa e ðLaþmÞ ð2:6Þ
and
I0
a ¼ Sað1   e baIaÞþIa e g; ð2:7Þ
where
La ¼
X
k
bkckaIk:
Here S0
a and I0
a represent the values of Sa and Ia at the
next time step. Each time step represents one day, and our
parameters are scaled as such. We assume a ﬁxed population
size N,s om acts as both the birth and death rate. ba
strain (a)( b)
R
effective
reproductive
ratio epidemic no epidemic
epidemic
compensatory mutation
R
R1<R R1<R
R2<R1
Figure 1. The two routes to emergence: (a) despite reduced ﬁtness R1, virus still causes epidemic; (b) no initial epidemic, but
compensatory mutation occurs before extinction and virus with ﬁtness R2 subsequently causes outbreak.
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ﬁxed rate g. Cross-immunity is given by the term cka. We set
this to decay exponentially with antigenic distance, and we
assume that strains give complete immunity to themselves,
so cka must be such that caa ¼ 1. Table 1 gives the values of
the parameters used in the model. The infectious period in
§2b was given by 1/g, so here g includes both recovery
from infection and natural death. However, for typical
human inﬂuenza parameters, the death rate makes a
negligible contribution to g.
A moving strain space, as outlined by Gog [19], is also
used to hasten computation. At each point in time all strains
with I . 0 are identiﬁed. By the nature of mutation in the
model, these cluster together and hence form a set of adja-
cent strains on our line. This set is active in the model, in
that the above equations only use the variables corresponding
to these prevalent strains. We update this active set at each
time step. If the backmost (i.e. least recent) strain in the set
falls below one infective, then we drop that variable, and if
a new strain appears (see §2b), we add new variables.
There is also a buffer in practice: if a new strain emerges,
we create variables associated to the next strain on the line,
in anticipation of its emergence.
We approximate the new level of susceptibility by multi-
plying the immunity with the previous strain by the
reduction owing to the imperfection of cross-immunity:
Saþ1 ¼ð N   SaÞe a:
This approximation underestimates immunity (in the
form of reduced transmissibility) slightly [19]; this could
affect accuracy under a high mutation rate, as more frequent
appearance of mutants would mean that the strain space
moves faster. However, it is less of an issue for rates similar
to those considered in this paper.
Drift speed, used to measure the speed of evolution in our
model, is deﬁned as the rate of emergence: the mean number
of strains that appear per year, over twenty 50-year simu-
lations. If the system goes extinct, we only look at the
behaviour up to the point of extinction. Over many runs,
this rate approaches a ﬁxed value for each R0 and x.W e
focus on x [ [0.6,1], however, as below these values a ten-
dency to lock or go extinct reduces the accuracy of the mean.
3. RESULTS
In a manner similar to that of Gog [19], our model exhi-
bits three dynamical behaviours: locked, where only one
strain circulates; drifting, with the continuing emergence
of strains; and extinction, where no strains remain. Once
drift is established, the system is more likely to continue
drifting than switch to the other two, especially when x
is larger. As x is reduced, a drifting system will have an
increasing tendency to fall into a locked state, or go
extinct.
First, to check the basic drift dynamics when there is
no ﬁtness loss (x ¼ 1), this model is compared with a
more basic deterministic model [16] using a continuous
version of equations (2.6) and (2.7). In this simpler
model, the authors could use an analytical method to
calculate drift speed c, and it was shown that:
c ¼ min
l
b   g   m þ 2mðcoshl   1Þ
l
  
:
Such a result is not possible for a stochastic system of
equations, but using R0 ¼ b/g, we can compare the above
theoretical result with the speed observed in our model
(using the same values of g, m and m). Simulations were
run for several values of R0, with the model deliberately
started in a drifting state, and calculated rate of emer-
gence over twenty 50-year runs. This gives a measure of
the speed of antigenic drift.
Figure 2 shows that the qualitative relationship
between R0 and speed of emergence is very similar, with
the rate of emergence dependent on R0 [ [1.4,3] in a
near-linear way. Although the model presented in this
paper evolves at a slower rate, this is most probably
owing to the stochastic step that tempers emergence.
However, when ﬁtness costs are introduced we see
something quite different. The left-hand side of ﬁgure 3
shows that when x , 1, the impact of R0 can become
Table 1. Parameters (sources: a [38,39]; g [40]).
variable description value
N population size 10 million
m host birth/death rate (80   365
days)
21
a coarseness of antigenic space 0.5
cka cross-immunity between strain
k and a
e
2ajk2aj
1/g infectious period 5 days
R0 basic reproductive ratio varies
b transmission rate R0g/N
x relative ﬁtness of mutant varies
m mutation rate (4 years)
21
35
(a)
(b)
30
25
20
15
10
5
15
s
p
e
e
d
s
p
e
e
d
10
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
5
R0
Figure 2. (a) Relationship between R0 and emergence rate
predicted by the deterministic model of Gog & Grenfell
[16]; (b) relationship in our model in the absence of ﬁtness
costs.
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in transmission can have a disproportionate effect on the
speed at which strains appear. Moreover, at the base of
this ‘drift cliff’, the relationship is much ﬂatter, and R0
has even less effect on evolution than it did at when
there were no ﬁtness constraints.
It also shows that, if x and R0 do not vary much
between strains, the appearance of a more ﬁt strain with
larger R0 could immediately impact the rate of emer-
gence, as any subsequent antigenic mutant will ﬁnd it
much easier to establish itself.
We can elucidate this result by considering the role of
the stochastic step in the rate of emergence. Figure 4
shows the probability a strain emerges for a particular
effective reproductive ratio, R1 ¼ xR0S/N,e q u a lt o12 P1
in equation (2.3). As R1 decreases towards 1, it becomes
less likely a new strain will emerge at that step. If S were
ﬁxed this would imply that, for each R0, there is a critical
value of x below which the appearance of strains is relatively
rare. Although a subsequent compensatory mutation and
emergence event can still occur, as shown by the solid
line in ﬁgure 4,t h i si sr a r ef o rR1 , 1a n dt h el o n gw a i t
for the appearance of a new strain slows down the rate of
emergence.
However, in our model, S is not ﬁxed because immu-
nity to each strain varies, and depends heavily on other
circulating infection. Therefore, we can only estimate
this relationship between x and R0. Simulations show
that susceptibility S to new strains falls between 0.75
and 0.9, so, by ﬁnding the region where xR0S/N , 1,
this can be used to estimate the location of the drop-off
in the rate of emergence. The right-hand side of
ﬁgure 3 shows that this theoretical result agrees with the
simulated behaviour, and hence provides an explanation
for the location of the drop-off in emergence.
(a) Vaccination
Vaccination will be explored by observing how the effects
of pulsed vaccination vary with ﬁtness and transmission.
For each x and R0, we let the system settle in a drifting
state before vaccinating a ﬁxed proportion of the
population chosen at random all at once, at time T, with
a vaccine most similar to the most recently emerged
strain, and cross-reactive with reduced factor e
2ad for a
strain distance d away. Hence, if v is the vaccine strain,
and we vaccinate a proportion p,
newSa ¼ð 1   pe aja vjÞSa:
The number of strains that emerge in the interval
[T,T þ 365] is then counted and this number is compared
with the expected rate of emergence for that x and R0,a s
calculated in ﬁgure 3, to obtain a relative speed between 0
and 1 as a result of vaccination of the population.
When 20 per cent of the population is vaccinated, the
rate of emergence of the strain with R0 ¼ 1.6 is slowed
much more than that of the one with R0 ¼ 2. Taking the
mean from 200 runs, ﬁgure 5 shows that while R0 makes
little difference when x ¼ 1, for x , 1, the infection with
R0 ¼ 2 can be far harder to control.
Thisisbecause,forastrainwithreducedﬁtnessR1barely
above 1, vaccination can lower susceptibility and put R1
15
10
m
e
a
n
 
s
p
e
e
d
5
0
1.0
0.9
0.8
x 0.7
0.6
1.5
2.0
R 0
R0
2.5
3.0
1.0
mean speed
0.9
0.8
x
0.7
0.6
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
(a)( b)
Figure 3. (a) Mean strains emerging per year, as a function of R0 and ﬁtness x. Twenty 50-year runs were used to calculate
speeds at 200 points in the R0/x plane. (b) A contour plot of this graph with the theoretical bounds of the drop-off overlaid
as dotted white lines. Values of R0 and x leading to a high rate of emergence are in the top right and to a low rate in the
bottom left. The lines are given by the value at which R1 ¼ xR0S/N ¼ 1, for S ¼ 0.75 (top) and S ¼ 0.9 (bottom), as susceptibility
to new strains falls within this range in model simulations.
1
P
(
e
m
e
r
g
e
s
)
0.1
0.01
10–4
10–5
0.001
0 0.5 1.0
R1
1.5 2.0
Figure 4. The probability a strain will emerge given R1 ¼
xR0S/N, as calculated from equation (2.3). Here S/N ¼ 0.9
and I0 ¼ 1. The dashed line shows the probability that it
will emerge in the absence of any compensatory mutations,
as in equation (2.1). A strain with R1 , 1 will ﬁnd it much
harder to cause an epidemic.
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R1 ¼ xR0S/N falls into this region. By contrast, with a
small increase in transmissibility (in this case R0 ¼ 2),
R1 is far enough from 1 so as to be far less affected by
vaccination. Even a 20 per cent reduction in the number
of susceptibles is not enough to push the strain into
the area of the drop-off, showing how R0 has become
disproportionately important.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
We have seen that if the ﬁtness losses that hamper RNA
viruses in vitro also affect an inﬂuenza virus escaping
host immunity, drift speed can be affected. Not only
does the relative ﬁtness of the virus, x, inﬂuence the
rate of antigenic escape, there is a feedback between the
evolutionary and epidemic processes, with susceptibility
and transmission at the population level deciding the
impact x has, and vice versa. As seen in ﬁgure 3, under
ﬁtness constraints, R0 can become disproportionately
important in dictating dynamics. This implies that two
strains with identical antigenic space and mutation rates
could evolve at very different rates with only a marginal
difference in R0, unlike that required by the deterministic
model of Gog & Grenfell [16]. This is illustrated by the
drop-off we see between regions of high and low rates of
emergence. We have shown that its location can be esti-
mated from the probability that a strain emerges in a
branching process; the theoretical prediction coincides
well with the simulated results. It also explains the
switch between the two stable patterns (locked and drift-
ing) observed by Gog [19]. As x decreases, the probability
of switching from a drifting to a locked (or extinct) state
becomes much larger, as emergence gets rarer. The
drop-off in the overall rate of emergence reﬂects this
reduction in tendency to drift. Further, the existence of
such a ‘drift cliff’ between regions of high and low rates
of emergence may affect the impact of antivirals, which
have been known to reduce the infectious period (and
hence the R0) of inﬂuenza [41].
As inﬂuenza vaccines are selected around nine months
in advance of each hemisphere’s annual winter epidemic
[42], it would be interesting to see whether there is any
indication in historical data that a particularly transmissi-
ble season elsewhere in those nine months leads to a
higher rate of emergence of new strains, and hence a vac-
cine update. This may be possible in retrospect, but it
would be difﬁcult to monitor the transmissibility of a
strain in real-time, with the aim of providing an indication
of the level of drift to be expected, as the accuracy of
transmissibility estimates are reduced by reporting errors
and gaps in surveillance [43]. In addition, calculating
R0 is difﬁcult for seasons with milder epidemics [11].
However, even if the theoretical mechanisms suggested
in this paper cannot immediately be applied to real-time
prediction, they could be useful in understanding the
differences between the emergence of H1N1 and H3N2
strains.
Second, we have seen that the disproportionate impact
of transmission continues when the immediate period
post-vaccination is considered; under ﬁtness constraints,
a small increase in R0 can make controlling the rate at
which new strains emerge much harder (ﬁgure 5), as
well as controlling the rate at which they spread. However,
it also implies that if strains do lose ﬁtness when escaping
immunity, vaccination could have a greater beneﬁt than a
simpler model would imply.
We have made several assumptions in our model. We
have used status-based variables for tractability, simplify-
ing the immune structure of the population. We have also
imposed a one-dimensional strain structure on inﬂuenza
evolution. Although this reﬂects the sequential appear-
ance of strains implied by the ladder-like phylogenetic
tree of inﬂuenza A [7,44], the causes of this phylogeny
are likely to be complex, with several explanations
having been proposed [1,17,18,45] for the observed evol-
ution. By using a simple line of strains, this paper does not
address the issue of strain dimensionality. Instead, it
assumes that, in the long term, through some mechanism
not included here, strain evolution follows a one-dimen-
sional path through antigenic space, with cross-reactivity
between strains decaying exponentially as the distance
between them increases.
Like several status-based models, we have also
assumed that cross-immunity acts to reduce transmission.
We do not consider spatial structure, which may also
affect how transmission rates impact on strain emergence
[12], nor seasonality: this paper presents a single popu-
lation with inﬂuenza constantly circulating. Our
parameters, although chosen to be plausible, are also
approximate. In particular, mutation rates can affect the
steepness of the drop-off: an increase leads to easier emer-
gence and a slightly ﬂatter relationship, whereas a slower
rate hinders the appearance of new strains and accentu-
ates the drop (results not shown). Further, the
mechanism of ﬁtness loss and regain, via compensatory
mutation, is necessarily approximate: a better under-
standing, ideally quantitative, of how antigenic escape
might incur a ﬁtness cost is needed if the effects of evol-
utionary constraints are to be modelled more accurately.
If it was the case that the process of emergence involved
several mutations, we would expect that the R ¼ 1 bound-
ary is still important in deciding the viability of a new
strain. Although simpliﬁcations have been made, our fra-
mework could easily incorporate new developments in the
understanding of inﬂuenza or RNA ﬁtness constraints.
Taking a two-tiered approach, we focused on the emer-
gence process and interaction of strains via epidemic
dynamics separately, combining a stochastic approach
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Figure 5. Relative speed of emergence as a result of vacci-
nation of 20% of the population. Calculated as number of
new strains in year post-vaccination divided by mean new
strains per year if no vaccination. Two hundred simulations
were performed for each value, and mean relative speed
taken. Open bars, R0 ¼ 1.6; closed bars, R0 ¼ 2.
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for the latter. This allowed us to not only draw attention to
the role R0 can have in dictating a strain’s rate of antigenic
escape, but also to show that inclusion of realistic evol-
utionary constraints, as well as careful consideration of
the emergence process, can have implications on the use
of vaccination in reducing the rate of such escape.
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